For a decade, crypto mining operators have guarded against one overriding threat: wallet theft.
To protect their strings of private keys, they built backup systems designed to leave nothing to chance.
But this time, the hacker ignored the wallets and went straight for the mining farms’ remote control panel.
On the night of November 15, tens of thousands of machines around the world quietly switched sides as their electricity meters kept running, collectively taking on a brief job for the hacker.
The Machines Working for the Hacker
At around 9 a.m. Beijing time on November 15, it was still around 6 p.m. on November 14 across the Pacific.
While checking the management console, operations staff at CoreX Hosting spotted something highly unusual: the pool addresses for several customers’ mining rigs had been quietly changed.
This was no isolated glitch. Mining rigs were switching pools on a large scale. The machines kept running, their fans kept spinning, and their computing power curves looked perfectly normal. Only in the backend data did the diversion become clear: the computing power was being routed to an entirely unfamiliar pool, OCEAN.
The machines themselves had not changed, but the Bitcoin they produced no longer belonged to their original owners. CoreX, the hosting provider, was the first to raise the alarm.
In Two Hours, 1.4% of Global Computing Power Changed Hands
The hacker exploited Commander, a mining rig management platform developed by Luxor to improve operational efficiency. Its premise is straightforward: with a single action, mining farms can update the configurations of thousands of machines at once. The hacker targeted precisely that one-click management privilege.
After breaching Commander, the hacker pushed configuration changes to tens of thousands of machines within a short period. Outside estimates put the affected computing power at as much as 13 EH/s, equivalent to 1.4% of the Bitcoin network’s total at the time. Media reports estimated that about 64,000 mining rigs were affected, though Luxor did not confirm the number.
Luxor patched the vulnerability within two hours. By noon on November 15, the remaining hijacked computing power had fallen below 1% of its peak. Even so, the hacker used OCEAN’s distinctive TIDES payout system to mine roughly 0.162 BTC overnight, worth just over $10,000 at the time.
Why OCEAN?
The choice of OCEAN showed the hacker knew what they were doing. The pool was co-founded with the involvement of Bitcoin Core developer Luke Dashjr, who stepped away from OCEAN in August this year, and is backed by a funding round led by Block’s Jack Dorsey. Its design was particularly well suited to this attack.
OCEAN uses a non-custodial model, sending rewards directly to miners’ wallets without holding the funds itself. That meant no intermediary could stop the payments once the attack was underway.
Its TIDES reward system distributes payouts in proportion to contributed work. Even if the attacker’s own address never found a block, it could still get paid whenever the pool as a whole did.
That explains the strange picture on-chain: the attacker’s address had found zero blocks, yet payments kept flowing in.
The Platform’s Account Conflicts With Security Researchers’ Records
After the incident, Luxor CEO Nick Hansen personally apologized and promised to compensate customers as though operations had proceeded normally and the breach had never happened.
But his characterization of the incident proved controversial: Hansen called it an “AI-driven attack.” He even described models stripped of their safety guardrails as scanning every corner around the clock.
The claim sounded alarming, but neither Luxor nor the subsequent technical postmortem provided conclusive evidence. Security firm SlowMist offered a more prosaic account, describing the incident simply as “unauthorized access.”
Whether AI played a role or this was conventional hacking remains unclear.
Computing Power Cannot Be Put in Cold Storage
The real significance of the incident lies not in the roughly $10,000 stolen, but in the mining industry’s broader security weakness.
For the past decade, mining farms have focused their defenses on hiding private keys and building cold-storage systems. But as computing power has scaled, operational control has become highly concentrated in cloud-based management consoles. Those consoles now serve as the keys to entire mining farms. Once compromised, tens of thousands of mining rigs can instantly be put to work for an attacker.
The incident exposes a harsh reality for the mining industry: money can be kept in cold storage, but computing power must remain in motion. As long as a mining operation is producing, its computing power must stay connected to the internet, and online instructions can be swapped out at any time.
The hacker spent an entire night to make just over $10,000. The mining farms promised to cover all losses, and the fluctuation barely registered across the network. As a money-making exercise, the attack may have been inefficient. As a warning, however, it was a textbook demonstration: an attacker can manipulate mining rigs across the network without touching a single coin.
The management consoles sold as a source of security may in fact be a mining farm’s greatest vulnerability. Operators will now need to pay much closer attention to whom their mining rigs are really working for in the middle of the night.

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